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Panpsychism and the Dissolution 
of Dispositional Properties 
Clark Butler 
Purdue University 
Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne Campus 
The present paper presents a case for panpsychism which is based on 
the rejection of Whitehead's well-known concept of the causal efficacy 
of immediately past actual occasions dispositionally exercising a power 
to influence their successors. But the rejection of causal efficacy, I shall 
argue, is required at a deeper level by the Whiteheadian and at once 
Hegelian concept of the self-conformation of successor occasions to 
their predecessors. At this deeper level, I shall also seek to show that 
dispositional physical properties for both Whitehead and Hegel must be 
reducible to phenomenal mental properties. 
This is the third argument for panpsychism on which I have worked. 
Beyond developing the argument, I will also seek to show that the 
tendency of these arguments is not purely metaphysical, i.e., that the kind 
of panpsychism which is defended helps us more fully explain results in 
the natural sciences. The first argument, an argument from parsimony 
(Butler, 1972), held that a cosmology with only one type of substantial 
individual is rationally preferable to a cosmology with more than one type. 
I argued that the brain of a conscious human being is the only entity which 
we know from within, and that it is known introspectively from within 
to be mental, to have phenomenal properties or qualia. I also argued that 
there is no way of observing elementary particles from within in order to 
know that they are not psychic in character, and further that it is possible 
to form a sufficiently general concept of mind to allow the possibility of 
attributing the mental property of sentience even to such particles. Mind 
in the minimal sense is sentient without any distinction between types of 
sentience corresponding to different specialized sense organs, and even 
without the distinction between pain and well-being necessary to conceive 
the mind of a one-celled organism. Mind is minimally a sensation of well-
being undisturbed by the sensation of pain. I concluded in the interests of 
parsimony that there is no sufficient reason to assert two types of substance 
(both mental and non-mental), and so that there is no sufficient reason to 
deny panpsychism. 
The second argument is a genetic argument (Butler, 1978). I argued 
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for mental evolution as well as physical evolution. In both cases evolution 
proceeds from the simple to the more complex. Mental evolution, I held, 
begins from the simplest conceivable mind, just as physical evolution 
proceeds from the simplest conceivable particle. Since the simplest 
conceivable mind is pre-biological-a mind devoid of the contrast between 
alternating pain and the sensation of well-being characteristic of the 
simplest conceivable mind of a one-celled organism-mental evolution 
begins with pre-biological mentality inhabiting inanimate matter. I still 
hold this point to be correct. However, in this paper I shall correct my 
original formulation of the argument, holding in the light of current natural 
science that, while the simplest conceivable particle with its specific mind 
may exist, neither physical nor mental evolution began from such a particle 
or mind. 
Paul M. Churchland concluded his reply to my original formulation of 
the two arguments for panpsychism in the following words: 
Unless panpsychism constructs genuinely explicit theoretical 
proposals and testable hypotheses, and unless it achieves 
some systematic successes in experimental predictions and 
technological control, it will continue to appear to be what it 
probably is-a theoretical hangover from a less knowledgeable 
time. (Churchland, 1996, p. 215) 
In light of the resurgent interest in panpsychism in recent years (e.g., 
Strawson, 2006; Basile, 2008; Skrbina, 2005), it can no longer be said that 
it is "a theoretical hangover from a less knowledgeable time." One purpose 
of this paper is more specifically to reply to Churchland by building a 
case for the explanatory and predictive power of panpsychism. He 
distinguished two types of panpyschism: one type ascribes both physical 
and mental properties throughout the natural world, while another type 
ascribes only mentalistic properties. But he concludes that neither type 
has shown anything to compare with the "experimental and explanatory 
successes" of modem atomism. I will defend the second type. 
In the first part of this paper I will introduce my third argument 
for panpsychism. It depends on the existence of mentalistic properties 
understood as qualia. Pain cannot be merely a brain state, since we feel 
sorry for people with pain but have no reason for feel sorry for anyone 
merely because of his or her brain state. I shall call this third argument 
the reductionistic argument. It argues for the reduction of physicalistic 
properties to mentalistic properties. I will argue that only mental 
properties, not physical properties, are ascribable by showing that physical 
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properties are incapable of coherent conceptual analysis without reduction 
to phenomenal properties. From this I will conclude that the explanatory 
success of physical science is indirectly an explanatory success of the 
complex mentalistic descriptions to which physicalistic descriptions can 
be reduced. By a correct conceptual analysis of physical properties, a 
panpsychism allowing for only occurrent mental or phenomenal properties 
inherits all the explanatory virtues of physical science. By occurrent 
properties I mean properties that are in principle directly inspectable, 
such as greenness or pain. They are phenomenally present to some 
subject of experience. Dispositional properties, if they exist, are not 
directly inspectable, but are only experimentally discoverable, such as the 
brittleness of a vase. 
Galen Strawson agrees that mental properties are "occurrent" rather 
than "dispositional," but he goes on to hold as a panpsychist that what 
is physical "cannot in principle be fully grasped in the terms of physics" 
(2006, pp. 3-4). I shall argue that, since dispositional properties like 
energy are incoherent, what is physical ultimately cannot at all be grasped 
in the terms of physics. 
Since the literature distinguishes between reductive and eliminative 
materialism, so we might distinguish between reductive and eliminative 
panpsychism. Reductive panpsychism admits the existence of physical 
bodies but analyzes them without remainder in terms of mentalistic 
descriptions. Eliminative panpsychism simply eliminates bodies. Since 
I find this to be a verbal distinction without important metaphysical 
consequences, we may allow either usage. In this paper I shall consistently 
conform to the reductive formulation. 
In the second part of this paper, I will develop the second genetic or 
evolutionary argument further. I will seek to show that, independently of 
the reductionistic argument introduced in this paper, panpsychism survives 
because different panpsychist hypotheses underlying different forms of 
matter on an evolutionary scale offer greater success in explanation and 
prediction than purely physicalistic hypotheses. I originally formulated 
the genetic argument without consideration of reductive panpsychism. If 
the reductive argument is now accepted, the "evolution of matter" becomes 
an evolution of mind understood in terms of the complex mentalistic 
descriptions into which physical dispositional properties will be analyzed 
in the next section. 
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I. Dispositional Properties and the Reductionistic 
Argument for Panpsychism 
In assessing the metaphysics of materialism we first take "physical" to 
mean what physical science says it means. Surveying physics texts, we find 
that physical properties are either relational like spatiotemporallocation or 
dispositional like force, mass, and energy. Dispositional properties are 
non-relational. Thus the atom could have the power to destroy cities even 
if no cities existed. A lone atom has no actual location, and thus no actual 
motion understood as change of location. The lone atom's property of 
having mass means that it is logically possible for bodies other than the 
atom to exist with location, and to cause a change in the atom's state of 
motion. A lone atom has no actual state of motion to be changed. Yet if 
we can coherently maintain that in a different logically possible world the 
atom has location which can be changed, this possibility is sufficient to 
make even a lone atom physical. 
Hegel (2008, p. 150) held that a power or force must express or 
manifest itself in order to exist. This suggests that something existing 
merely by itself in the world could not have a dispositional property. For 
such a property to exist, its expression must be solicited by the existence 
of a second thing. This apparent contradiction between what we ordinarily 
suppose regarding dispositional properties and what Hegel seems to 
suggest can be resolved, I think, only if we suppose that the expressions 
of a force which Hegel finds to be necessary to its existence include 
logically possible expressions, not just actual expressions. An actual and 
thus not merely possible disposition, e.g., actual genius, is relative to all 
logical possibilities of its manifestation. Actual works of genius are only 
necessary to verify actual genius, not for actual genius to exist. To argue 
that an isolated atom lacks a dispositional property of physics like mass 
because none can be verified by observing its expression would be to 
commit the basic error of the verifiability principle of meaning. 
Anything that has a dispositional property before exercise of the 
disposition would somehow, as an underlying subject of change, have to 
be identical with the same thing during its exercise of the disposition. But 
the identity in question is not the logical identity of the indiscemibility of 
identicals. The green leaf in the Spring has a disposition to tum brown 
in the Fall, but the green leaf and the brown leaf are discernible and thus 
are not logically identical. Yet they are commonly viewed to be bodily 
identical. Aristotle-as we shall note below-believed that any body 
that has a disposition or potentiality exists continuously from a state of 
unactualized potentiality to a state of actualized potentiality. The body is 
thus a "substance" in the Aristotelian sense. However, in contemporary 
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quantum physics events are discontinuous. Nonetheless, an electron in 
one orbit can still have a disposition to change orbits. It can be bodily 
identical with a discernibly different electron in another orbit without 
moving continuously from one orbit to the next. 
A leaf has a disposition for its velocity to be altered by a force 
exercised upon it by a second body, such as the wind. The leaf prior to 
the acceleration is bodily identical with the leaf after the acceleration, 
quite independently of the question of continuity. Based on a principle 
derived from the Eleatic Zeno, I will maintain that the leaf and indeed 
all bodies are, like the electron, discontinuous. My argument against 
dispositional properties will depend on showing, first, that to be a body 
in fact cannot be to exist continuously. If bodies exist, they must each 
exist as a temporal aggregate of externally related changeless events, each 
devoid of dispositional properties. For anything that had dispositional 
properties would have to be capable of change. Secondly, my refutation 
of dispositional properties will depend quite generally on showing that the 
properties of a bodily aggregate are reducible to properties of the members 
of the aggregate, in this case changeless events. Since to exist is to have 
properties, irreducible bodies with dispositional properties, by virtue of 
their reduction to events, cannot exist. Thus a body's disposition to be 
altered in its velocity when exposed to an external force could only lie in 
the fact that future events in the series either occur in a different direction 
from previous events in the series, or occur further apart from one another 
than previous events in the series, or both. 
Xg 
~ 
x6 
xs 
x1 x2 x3 x4 
Change in Vector 
x, Xz x3 x4 xs x6 ~ xs x, Xz x3 x4 
Change in Speed Change in Vector and Speed 
This reduction, by reducing dispositional physical properties, seems to 
leave us with relational properties, namely, relative positions. However, 
once I reach a panpsychist conclusion, I shall argue in a manner reminiscent 
of Leibniz that positions can be reduced or eliminated in favor of mental 
properties, namely, perceptions or prehensions. One event is more remote 
in position than another event in relation to a third event because the first 
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event's has a certain sense impression which is smaller than an otherwise 
similar sense impression belonging to the second event. 
Continuous change is impossible as long as we maintain the principle 
that for an event to occur it must take time. The principle belongs to the 
rational core of Zeno's refutation of motion (Butler, 1981). Continuous 
motion would depend on a body occupying an infinity of successive 
positions in a finite amount of time. But how much time must be spent in a 
single position in order to be in that position at all? If an event's being at a 
certain place must take a finite duration of time to occur at all, continuous 
motion would take an endless duration of time, and thus could never be 
completed. Analogously, if you were happy yesterday but for no time at 
all, you were not happy at all yesterday. Likewise, you could not have 
been on Mars last night but for no time at all. If you were there for no time 
at all, you were not there at all. No body that fails to pause momentarily 
in the occupation of a place is ever really there at all. 
Infinitesimal Durations? Continuous motion is impossible whether 
because the body is in a place only for some time or because it is there 
merely instantaneously, i.e., for no time at all and thus not at all. But a 
third possibility is discussable by which to save continuous change. It may 
be suggested that change might prove possible by a body's occupation of 
a position for an infinitesimal duration. By an infinitesimal duration we 
mean a duration that is infinitely small, thus not determinately small. The 
duration is neither zero nor finite, but is vanishingly small. In other words, 
no matter how small we may imagine the duration to be, the truth is that the 
amount of time which the body spends at a certain place is even smaller. 
If we say that it spends a billionth ofthe second in one place, it is at once 
there for a half of a billionth of a second. But it is not for that reason that 
we can rest content with the supposition that it occupies the place for a 
half of a billionth of a second. It is there for less than half a billionth of a 
second, but never for any stable finite duration no matter how small. 
We may imagine the series of ever smaller fractions proceeding 
endlessly. The number of fractions in this diminishing series is infinite. 
Yet this infinity of ever smaller fractions is itself no more a fraction than the 
number of natural numbers is a natural number. The duration of an event 
may include an infinity of infinitesimals, a cardinal sum of infinitesimals, 
but there is no such thing as a determinate infinitesimal duration. There 
is no need to dispute the existence of infinitesimals in mathematics. We 
are free to extend the number system to include infinitesimals (Robinson, 
1996). But an infinitesimal is not an infinitely small fraction of a natural 
number. It is an endless series of diminishing fractions tending at the 
limit to zero without ever reaching zero. The point is not that there are 
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no infinitesimals numbers, but that no infinitesimal number can be the 
measure ofthe duration of an event. 
Duration, like size, is measurable. And for something to be measured 
there must be a unit of measure of which the thing being measured has a 
determinate amount. Neither an infinitesimal nor an infinite number can 
function as a unit of measure. To measure is to count a finite number of 
iterations of some unit. To measure a length of time, at least approximately, 
is to count up to a certain number of some unit, such as a billionth or 
trillionth of a second. A minute can be measured as sixty seconds or a 
million microseconds, but not as any finite amount of infinitesimals. Just 
as there is no such thing as the next instant, there is no such thing as the 
next infinitesimal tending at the limit at that instant. If these statements 
pass muster, the existence of infinitesimal numbers is incapable of saving 
continuous change. Even if there is an infinitely small time segment there 
is no infinitely brief duration of any actual occurrence. If we imagine the 
volume of a body shrinking to the point that it has no volume at all, by 
the same token it becomes no body at all. Similarly, if we imagine the 
duration of an event losing duration to the point that it has no duration at 
all, it ceases to occur at all. No change can be a continuous infinite series 
of states of affairs. But accidental change, as conceived by Aristotle, did 
presuppose a continuously existing subject of change passing through an 
endless series of accidental states in a finite duration. If such accidental 
change is impossible, dispositional properties are also impossible. 
Aristotle and the Refutation ofContinuants. Aristotle, countering Zeno, 
supposed one-to-one correspondence between an infinity of durationless 
instants in a time segment and the infinity of points of furthest advance 
from a body's point of departure to its point of arrival in motion. But this 
implies that being at a place takes no time at all, and that means it never 
happened at all. It is Aristotle who seems to make a false assumption 
when he writes: 
Zeno's argument makes a false assumption in asserting that 
it is impossible for a thing to pass over or severally to come 
in contact with infinite things in a finite time. For there are 
two senses in which length and time and generally anything 
continuous are called infinite: they are called so either in respect 
of divisibility or in respect of their extremities. So while a thing 
in a finite time cannot come in contact with things quantitatively 
infinite, it can come in contact with things infinite in respect 
of divisibility. (Aristotle, 1941, Bk. VI, Ch. 2, 233a & b). 
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Zeno refuted continuous change of place, but analogous arguments refute 
all forms of continuous change. The sky from midday to midnight cannot 
get continuously darker, since there would have to been an infinite number 
of shades of darkness in a finite duration of time. Each shade would have 
to exist for a finite duration, since to have a shade of darkness for no time 
at all is not to have that shade of darkness at all. 
A Proof of Qualia. This line of argument leads to an event cosmology, 
replacing the concept of change in the career of a continuant with that of 
succession. We have a finite number of shades of darkness in succession, 
with a discontinuous jump from one to the next, metaphorically a motion 
picture theory of reality. Since each event is momentary and internally 
unchanging in its properties, it lacks any potentialities or dispositional 
properties implying accidental properties that can change. 
Since mass, energy and force can exist only as dispositional properties, 
it follows that nothing can have such properties. But, since an event, 
like anything that is, must have some determinate properties in order to 
avoid being nothing at all, we infer that it must have non-dispositional, 
categorical or occurrent properties. Phenomenal properties, we suggest, 
remain the only plausible candidates for such occurrent properties. A 
strong best argument for qualia seems to be that the physical descriptions 
to which reductive materialists would reduce qualia, or in favor of which 
eliminative materialists wish to eliminate qualia, cannot be analyzed 
without reducing physical properties precisely to qualia. 
The All or Nothing Principle. Note that change of intensity is 
also impossible. Given an infinite number of degrees of intensity on a 
continuum, an event that began with low intensity and then continuously 
increased its intensity could never complete the process. For it would 
have to enjoy each of infinitely numerous degrees of intensity for a finite 
duration of time. The conclusion is that each event, whether a quantum 
event or an event of human experience, reaches its maximum intensity all 
at once and maintains that intensity constant throughout the duration of 
its occurrence. The world presents itself as profoundly digital. The only 
instantaneous events that exist are limits, whether the beginning or end 
of a concrete event enjoying duration. "Though we cannot think of an 
instantaneous event falling within our experience that is not a terminus of 
something that takes time, we can think of plenty of events that are such 
termini" (Anscombe, 1964, p. 18). 
A temporally extended event has a finitely small duration. It has 
continuous existence but no continuous change. This makes the succession 
of events staccato, abrupt, disjointed. This view may not be as aesthetically 
94 
Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties 
pleasing as the belief in continuous change. As one recent defender of 
Zeno writes, "we are only accustomed to continuous motion after all, and 
we cherish it so deeply" (Gao, 2006). But what gives us the right to decide 
questions of metaphysics by an appeal to aesthetic consolations? 
Once we say that an event takes time, this principle would apply to any 
temporally successive phases of what Whitehead calls the concrescence of 
an actual occasion. And this would mean that the process of concrescence 
would be endless, that it could never be completed. Ultimately 
Whitehead must resolve this problem by viewing the successive phases of 
concrescence as an external reconstruction of the actual occasion, rather 
than as a real process intrinsic to it. "The analysis of an actual occasion 
is only intellectual. ... Each actual entity is a cell with atomic unity. But 
in analysis it can only be understood to be a process" (Whitehead, 1979, 
p. 227). 
Robert Neville has raised the problem of how, in light of the 
discontinuity of actual occasions, we can understand the continuity of 
personal identity as a personally ordered society of successive occasions. 
Whitehead understands the continuity of a person over his or her career 
as consistent with the discontinuity of occasions: the same form of the 
individual is replicated or reiterated from occasion to occasion. Neville 
agrees, but correctly specifies that the reiterated form is normative. The 
present occasion in the career of an individual continues the life of the 
same individual by prehending and identifying with commitments made 
in previous occasions in the same life. "It is important for freedom to 
notice that the reiterated pattern can include moral factors like promises" 
(Neville, 1974, p. 42). 
Hegel and Whitehead. The denial of dispositional properties and 
their dissolution into occurrent phenomenal properties is ultimately a 
point of agreement between Hegel and Whitehead. Hegel held that only 
the present event, the effect, causes the past event to be a cause (Hegel, 
2008, pp. 167-168). The causal status of a past event thus can only be 
acquired posthumously. But a posthumous property is incoherent, since 
it is a property which is possessed even after what possesses it no longer 
exists! Since to have properties is to be, posthumous properties are 
impossible. Thus we must finally deny the causal efficacy of the past. We 
must substitute for the concept of causal efficacy a concept of the present 
event's act of selective "prehension" or self-conformation (as well as its 
selective disconformation) to the past. 
Whitehead opposed Hume by upholding the directly intuited causal 
efficacy of a prehended flash in causing the act of blinking. "The man 
will explain his experience by saying 'The flash made me blink' ... The 
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philosophy of organism accepts the man's explanation" Whitehead, PR, 
pp. 174-175). Elsewhere Whitehead writes: "Locke's doctrine of 'power' 
is reproduced in the philosophy of organism ... In Locke's phraseology the 
objectified actual occasion is then exerting power" (1979, p. 58). For many 
people, the point about the flash of light and blinking is Whitehead at his 
most memorable. The problem with this is that, according to Whitehead's 
own philosophy of organism, the objectified actual occasion is no longer 
active or creative. 
[T]here is a vector character that transfers the cause into 
the effect. There is a feeling from the cause which acquires 
the subjectivity of the new effect without loss of its original 
subjectivity in the cause. Simple physical feelings embody the 
reproductive character of nature. In virtue of these feelings 
time is the conformation of the present to the immediate past. 
(Whitehead, 1979, pp. 237-238) 
In this quote Whitehead starts by buying into the causal power of the past 
and then ends by invoking only the present's exercised power of self-
conformation in some respect to the prehended past. Only the present 
prehending occasion is active. So we must really say, not that the flash made 
me blink, but that the blinking prehended the flash and at once preserved 
it within itself as a stimulus of itself. The present subjective activity of 
blinking contains an objectification of a non-causal just past flash under 
the new determination which it never actually had, that of being a cause 
or stimulus. The past no longer subjectively acts, but is present only as an 
objectively immortal stimulus through the present event's appropriation 
of it as such. 
All prehension contains both novelty, but also a decision to allow 
itself to be influenced by the past. This is a decision to disconform in one 
way even by conforming to it in another way. For example, a photonic 
eventn in the career of a photon in a vacuum disconforms to the position 
ofthe prehended previous such event
0
_1• But eventn conforms to photonic 
event
0
_1 in the matter of the distance of event0 _1 from its predecessor event0 _2• 
Assuming the cogency of more general arguments for panpyschism, here is 
a panpsychist hypothesis for understanding in particular constant velocity 
for a photon. To complete the hypothesis, the actual distance of photonic 
eventn from its prehended predecessor event
0
_1 is to be understood in terms 
of the magnitude of the impression of the just past photonic event
0
_1 as 
directly prehended or objectified within the phenomenal field of event
0
• 
Eventn is internally related to event
0
_1, which is not internally related to the 
96 
Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties 
novel event . Each event in the series shares the instant of its cessation 
n 
with the instant of the next event's onset, making direct prehension of the 
preceding event possible. If we were to revert to the language of causal 
efficacy, this asymmetry would become the asymmetry of the causal 
relation to which Charles Hartshorne has repeatedly pointed (e.g., 1984, 
p. 106). 
I eventn-21 eventn-l I eventn I ••• 
Prehension is generalized from perception, and is analyzable in terms of 
phenomenal properties. If an event occurs but cannot have dispositional 
physical properties, the only tenable mind-brain identity thesis is that 
the identity of sentience with a physical brain state is identity of itself 
with itself under a false description. Yet something can be singled out 
even under a false description (Donnellan, 1967). Assuming that no 
comparable incoherence can be found in description by phenomenal 
properties, phenomenological description proves to be the true description 
of what is falsely re-identified in physicalistic terms. We conclude that, 
if physicalistic descriptions have explanatory and predictive power as 
Churchland maintains, a panpsychism with description merely in terms 
of occurrent phenomenal properties also has explanatory and predictive 
power. It inherits that power. 
II. Particular Panpsychist Explanatory and Predictive Hypotheses 
My original genetic argument for panpsychism concluded that complex 
minds have evolved ultimately from the simplest conceivable mind, and 
that the simplest conceivable mind is pre-biological, lacking the ability 
to alternate between pain and well-being through adaptive responses to 
threatening stimuli. This genetic argument creates a research program 
for cosmology as comparative psychology. The aim of this program is 
to hypothesize different forms of mentality to help more fully explain 
different apparent forms of physical behavior, including behavior in the 
realm of inanimate matter. I shall construct a theory ofthe initial stages in 
the evolution of mind in the light of contemporary natural science, arguing 
that mind at each stage has explanatory power, allowing a prediction of 
bodily behavior with greater confidence. Thus the explanatory power 
of panpsychism is not merely inherited through the above analysis of 
dispositional physical properties into phenomenal properties. 
I suggest that physical individuals change in themselves (and not 
merely for external observers), and that intrinsic change requires an 
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individual body or particle to discriminate between and contrast qualitative 
differences in its immediate environment. The individual distinguishes 
qualitatively between a just past qualitative state calling for one behavioral 
response and a new state calling for a new response. The new state, due 
its exclusion of the alternative previous state, is said to be "informative." 
All particles and bodies are alleged, in their behavioral responses, to 
be selectively sensitive to various stimulus situations in their changing 
environments. Yet this is not by itself an argument for panpsychism, since 
is assumes that that sensation mediates stimulus and response without 
argument. But if our three arguments-the argument from parsimony, 
the genetic argument, and the reductive argument-esstablish the general 
panpsychist thesis, we are called upon if possible to provide a specific 
panpsychist hypothesis to explain apparent change in a particle, atom, or 
molecule. 
To explain is to reply to the question "Why?" As long as one can still 
ask "Why?" without a satisfactory answer, any explanation is incomplete. 
If we learn as a general law that photons impinging on the retina tend to 
cause blinking, this will permit us to predict blinking. But the question 
will still be unanswered "Why do photons impinging on retina cause 
blinking?" Once we learn that photons cause sensed pain and that the 
pain causes blinking, we understand better why photons cause blinking. 
This will not enable us to predict more behavior which we could not have 
otherwise predicted. But it will provide a more satisfactory explanation, 
and hence a more reliable prediction. If we do not know why a particular 
cause (e.g., stimulus) results in a particular effect (e.g., response), we have 
less assurance that the prediction will uniformly hold than if we do know 
why. 
The knee jerk is another example of a reflex mediated by sensation, 
though here the sensation is not one of intense pain as in the case of 
blinking. Yet there is a noticeable sensation of tension which is then 
released by the jerk. However, many reflexes occur throughout the human 
body without any noticeable sensation of pain or even tension. But, since 
they are not mediated by the central nervous system, we would not expect 
to be conscious of any pain or sensed tension involved. 
A mentalistic understanding of the response explains more than 
mere constant conjunction between apparent physical descriptions. 
Yet the explanation of such an unconditioned reflex by introduction of 
the hypothesis of intermediary pain is not teleological explanation. A 
conditioned response is teleological. When a dog performs a trick for a 
biscuit we may suppose that the dog learns to see the trick as a means to 
alleviating a pang of hunger. But an unconditioned response is different. 
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When photons strike the retina, the blinking response is normally 
automatic, without contemplation by the organism of the blinking as a 
means of relieving the sensation of pain. 
My main explanatory panpsychist hypothesis is that a stimulus-
response model, modified according to Hegel's and Dewey's conception 
of it, should be applied to the behavior ofbodies in the world of inanimate 
matter. This model assumes both the stimulus and the response to be 
describable by what are at first glance, pending reduction, physical 
properties. A stimulus at first glance has a dispositional physical property 
consisting in its capacity for causing a response. Yet it is of the nature 
of a disposition that it can exist without being exercised. It is only a 
tendency. The stimulus-response model I use further supposes that in the 
biological world no response to a stimulus is fully explainable unless it is 
understandable by the respondent's intention. It is not understandable that 
a sudden packet of photons causes someone to blink unless we suppose 
the photons to cause a sensation of pain from which the respondent 
intends to escape, hence unless we introduce an intermediary mental event 
connecting the physical stimulus situation to the physical response. The 
blinking response expresses a mental intention, thought it is not a learned 
response like the trick learned by a dog for the sake of a biscuit. 
A stimulus-response model is a cause-effect model. The physical 
stimulus is a cause, and the response an effect. As we have explained, 
the cause does not exist before the effect. The particular present effect 
causes the cause to be the cause which it is. The effect solicits the cause 
to express itself the present, in that effect. A response as a particular 
response to a particular stimulus solicits the stimulus to be a stimulus of 
that response. The heat of a flame first stimulates the response of a child's 
finger outstretched with intention of touching it. The child touches it, and 
it hurts. Afterwards the heat is a very different stimulus, stimulating the 
response of flight in a child who remembers the pain of touching. The 
stimulus lacks the causal power it has independently of its effect, but 
becomes the stimulus it is in light of its effect. A force, as Hegel holds, is 
what it is through its expression. The response of flight is the expression 
of a stimulus. Since attraction and flight are different responses to heat, the 
stimulus in one case is a different stimulus from the conditioned or learned 
response which occurs in the second case. The stimulus which stimulates 
flight is not the stimulus which stimulates touching. Flight is not a purely 
passive response to heat as a pain-provoking stimulus, since it embodies 
the intention of avoiding pain. The experience of pain transforms the heat 
from being a stimulus of touching into being one of flight. The stimulus of 
flight really only exists in the present experience of it as provoking flight. 
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This was Dewey's conclusion in reflecting on the reflex arc, grounded in a 
Hegelian reflection on cause and effect, force and its expression. 
Our specific panpsychist hypothesis concerning the apparent world of 
inanimate matter-apparent pending reduction-is that intrinsic change 
before the evolution of life exhibits one genuine feature of life, namely, 
stimulus-response behavior, but without exhibiting other characteristics 
necessary to life such as reproduction or evolutionary adaptation over 
generations to a changing environment. Nor does apparent stimulus-
response behavior at the pre-biological level appear to display the kind 
of learning or variability of response through habituation or sensitization 
which is displayed by living organisms. We would not want to call a 
photon, an apparent photonic particle of matter, a living organism simply 
because it adapts to the impact of a non-transparent surface by changing 
the direction of its motion. Yet its behavior becomes understandable on 
a stimulus-response model if we attribute some analogue of pain to a 
photonic event upon impact. We thus hypothesize that the pain-mediated 
stimulus-response behavior of the most primitive one-celled organism is 
not the first such behavior to emerge in the apparent physical universe. 
The hypothesis is that change in ostensible particles, atoms, and molecules 
should also be interpreted as such stimulus-response behavior. The 
evolution of the first life is not the first evolution of stimulus-response 
behavior, but is rather the complication of such behavior to include 
other emergent factors of life such as growth, organization, metabolism, 
reproduction, adaptation through generations to a changed environment, 
memory, and the habituation or sensitization of responses to stimulus 
situations. 
I am not hypothesizing, however, that unconditioned stimulus-
response behavior mediated by pain, reflex behavior for short, is a cosmic 
constant. Supposing that there is a generalized sort of"pain" or discomfort 
which, like its opposite the sensation of well-being, does not depend 
on a specialized sense organ, a reflected photon shows understandable 
reflex behavior. But a photon maintaining its velocity in a vacuum (or 
in gravitational field with curved lines of inertial motion) does not show 
such behavior. Reflex behavior contrasts to the non-stimulus-response 
behavior of a photon of constant velocity. Non-stimulus-response behavior 
becomes understandable by a different but equally specific explanatory 
panpsychist hypothesis, by the hypothesis of an occurrent state of well-
being as the reality behind the photon's non-exercise of its apparent 
dispositional property of potentially changing direction upon impact. (Yet 
if the photon's dispositional property, like all such properties, is merely 
apparent, its failure to exercise a dispositional property which we merely 
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suppose it might exercise-subject to the reduction or elimination of 
dispositional properties in generally-is also merely apparent.) 
A reflex is an automatic response to a stimulus. The reflection of a 
photon becomes such an automatic response. The panpsychist hypothesis 
makes the behavior of the photon understandable. In this case as well, 
the physical stimulus by itself does not provide a complete explanation 
of the physical response. The question remains: why does this stimulus 
cause this response? That question can be answered by realizing that the 
unreduced or apparent physical stimulus does not directly "cause" the 
response. It "causes" the response indirectly by directly causing pain. 
More exactly, the photonic response directly apprehends or prebends the 
stimulus as painful. 
A stimulus has the dispositional physical property of being capable of 
causing a response. However, the disposition is not the only condition of 
its exercise. A reflex is not automatic in the sense that it cannot empirically 
fail. The photon as a body must continue to exist and not decay upon 
striking a reflective surface if the redirection of its motion is to occur. The 
reality behind merely apparent dispositional properties is either occurrent 
general pain or occurent well-being. 
A question which this raises is whether a mind that consciously 
discriminates in this manner is the simplest conceivable mind which we 
must suppose to be the starting point of mental evolution. Mentally as well 
as physically, evolutionary theory asserts that what is complex evolves out 
of what is simpler, though not necessarily out of the least simple conceivable 
unreduced particle or mind. The simplest conceivable particle capable of 
change is stable. It cannot be a completely unstable momentary quantum 
event. The absolutely simplest conceivable mind would be that of an 
absolutely stable apparent particle. Such particles, pending their reduction, 
may exist. They may exist in the background radiation of so-called dark 
matter incapable of emitting photons. Absolutely stable parallel particles, 
all flying with the same velocity, or equally stable dispersed particles 
reaching the velocity of escape in the expanding universe, might exhibit 
mentality at its simplest conceivable level. But we can never verify that 
a particle is absolutely stable, since the fact that it has endured until the 
present does not prove that it will not decay in the future. The simplest 
conceivable mind would be a sensation of a single undifferentiated quality, 
containing no information-bearing discrimination of distinct phenomenal 
qualities, hence no consciousness conceived as a contrast effect. Such a 
mind would be the mind of a totally unchanging stable particle following 
the law of inertia, without being impacted by any external force. 
David Chalmers suggests that all experience contains information-
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bearing consciousness of contrasting phenomenal states. But this is to 
suppose that all particles intrinsically change by mentally contrasting 
different phenomenal states eliciting different behavioral responses. 
[W]herever there is causal interaction, there is information, 
and wherever there is information, there is experience. . . . [H] 
aving experiences ... may qualify as mind in its simplest form. 
(Chalmers, 1996, pp. 297-299) 
But I am arguing that the mental life of the simplest conceivable particles 
does not exhibit change or consciousness of different phenomenal states, 
so that Chalmers theory of experience or mind as involving the experience 
of contrasting phenomenal qualities cannot be a fully universal theory of 
mind. 
However, mind at this simplest conceivable level would lack any 
evolutionary potential. Particles of a nature allowing us to hypothesize the 
simplest conceivable mind may not even exist. All particles may eventually 
decay. Ancient atomism depended on a Parmenidean assumption in holding 
that atoms were everlasting. From being we could only derive being, not 
non-being. But the fact that an atom or even the world exists at time t1 
does not prove that it also exists at time tl+n· The fact the world exists now 
may induce us into the lazy certitude that it will also exist thereafter, but 
that fact provides no real evidence. Yet contemporary particle physics is 
not party to that Parmenidean assumption. As a consequence of the fact 
that we cannot assume the existence of the simplest conceivable particles, 
we cannot assume the existence of the simplest conceivable minds. Since 
biological forms of mind that are not purely chemical exist, they have 
evolved, but they have evolved from a simpler form of mind capable of 
decay, which is a precursor of death. A still simpler form of apparent matter 
may exist, and it is important to have a specific panpsychist hypothesis to 
explain it if it does exist. But, even if there is such a form of matter, it 
is an evolutionary dead-end. Our panpsychist hypothesis in the case of 
particles capable of decay invokes the second to the simplest conceivable 
type of mind, mind consisting in the experience of well-being followed 
by pain and then the cessation of sensation, the cessation of existence. 
The next higher degree of mental complication, corresponding to particles 
capable of surviving change, is then a mind capable of avoiding decay by 
an adaptive response. 
A good hypothesis in natural science, including a good panpsychist 
hypothesis, is one that helps explain a body's apparent physical behavior. 
The type of mind posited in a given case must be a type that has the "causal 
102 
Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties 
power" to modify or maintain subsequent bodily states in a particular way. 
Spinoza and Nietzsche propose that the sensation of generalized pleasure 
or well being-as contrasted to specific organ pleasure dependent on a 
specific sense organ-is causally effective in maintaining or increasing a 
pattern ofbehavior (Spinoza, 2000, Pt. III, Prop. X, Note; Nietzsche, 1967, 
Vol. 1, Bk. 2, §44). The generalized sensation of pain, on the other hand, 
has a physical tendency to cause non-self-maintenance or decay by a body 
or particle. These two hypotheses are confirmed in human experience. If 
the three general arguments for panpsychism given above are valid, some 
special panpsychist hypothesis is needed to explain different physical 
behaviors at the pre-biological level. The stability of an undreduced 
particle is partly explainable by hypothesizing that it is inhabited by a 
general sensation of well-being which is positively reinforcing, while the 
decay of a particle is explainable by the hypothesis that its well-being is 
disturbed by pain for which it has no adaptive response. Pain and decay 
occur in such a particle when the conditions of its support fall out from 
under it. That is what happens to a particle in isolation when emitted from 
another particle. Only the absorption of an isolated particle into a larger 
stable particle may again give it stability. 
If the argument we have previously given against the possibility of 
change is valid, we must ultimately reject the concept of "interaction" 
between particles. Interaction means that one particle acts on another 
which reacts on the first. Due to this reaction, the first particle would 
change. From the standpoint of quantum theory, the concept of interaction 
between continuants yields to the concept of successive discrete events, 
each at rest through its own duration. The burning log in the fire place 
heats a room, and then is cooled by the room which it has heated. 
Common sense holds that the burning log and the atmosphere of the room 
interact. The log indirectly causes itself to lose heat. By our panpsychist 
hypothesis, later events in that series of events which we call the log act to 
negatively prehend some character of earlier events in the same series. (I 
use the Whiteheadean term "prehend" connote to a cosmically generalized 
concept of sensory perception.) 
Contrary to classical atomism, to be destroyed in contemporary 
physics does not mean to have structure and then decompose into simpler 
particles. A particle, unlike a classical atom, can be simple and yet decay. 
It can go out of existence without dividing. It can pass from some finite 
energy level to a zero energy level. Yet even if the particle does not decay, 
each quantum event in the succession of events which is the particle can 
perish. An electronic quantum event upon impact in a one orbit can pass 
into a zero energy level in that orbit, but energy is maintained because the 
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cessation of an electronic quantum event in that orbit is compensated by 
the emergence of another electron event in another orbit. Quantum theory 
implies that there are no particles with continuous existence, hence no 
absolutely stable quantum events. The question of the "indestructibility" 
of a particle becomes the question of whether the series of quantum events 
is endless. 
A photon is not an indestructible particle. As long as it follows the law 
of inertia in a gravitational field without colliding with another particle, 
we hypothesize that it exhibits mentality at the simplest conceivable level, 
without any differentiation between sensed qualities. Its sensation of well-
being "causes" it to hold its state of motion constant. In other words, 
the next photonic quantum event positively prehends the rate of change 
of place shown by previous photonic quantum events. Photonic eventn 
distances itself from the place of photonic eventn-l in the same way in 
which photonic eventn-l distances itself from photonic eventn_2 • It selects 
the previous event's way of selecting its place on the basis of the photonic 
eventn_2 , which in turn preserves the way in which eventn_3 selects place 
on the basis of the place of eventn_4, and so on. Such photonic events 
experience well-being. But if a photon decays in photosynthesis as its 
energy is absorbed in the creation of a higher energy particle, it experiences 
well-being interrupted by discomfort. Thirdly, the photon in collision 
with a non-transparent surface experiences discomfort, and restores well-
being only by changing direction. Discomfort repels it from replicating 
its behavior. 
If an unstable neutron disintegrates after fifteen minutes when ejected 
from the nucleus of an atom, the explanatory panpsychist hypothesis is 
still different: the neutron consciously experiences something akin to pain 
in contrast to traces of the lost state of well-being which it had in the 
atomic nucleus. The neutron is not inhabited by the mind of a changing 
particle, let along that of living organism. It lacks a repertoire of adaptive 
responses with which to counter different forms of pain-provoking stimuli 
and thus with which to restore well being. The mind of a living organism 
even at the level of the amoeba is more highly evolved than that of a 
particle surviving threatening stimuli by an adaptive response. Yet both the 
changing particle and the amoeba are capable of passing from well-being 
to discomfort and back again to well being. The mental life in both cases 
is thus a repeated cycle of well-being disturbed and well-being restored. 
(This is not an assertion offact, but an explanatory hypothesis that-in the 
light of parsimony, the evolutionary theory of mind, and the reducibility of 
dispositional physical properties-is alleged to be more likely true or not.) 
The thesis that discomfort evidences a threat of tissue damage and 
104 
Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties 
causes flight, and that pleasure conceived very generally is a cause of the 
continuance of behavior, is empirically confirmed in the human case. Pain, 
a mental event, has the causal power to alter behavior. For example, we 
have noted the stimulus consisting in photons hitting the retina, ostensibly 
a physical event. The adaptive response is the physical event of blinking. 
But what explains the fact that this stimulus causes this response? The 
physical stimulus of photons hitting the retina causes a mental sensation 
of pain, we have said, and that pain in a living organism in turn causes a 
physical blinking. 
A one-celled organism also exhibits stimulus-response behavior. 
When an amoeba is exposed to oil in water, it withdraws. The panpsychist 
hypothesis is that the amoeba also experiences a kind of pain or discomfort, 
which causes the behavior of withdrawal. The amoeba is capable of a 
range of adaptive responses, and beyond this range dies. The amoeba 
is in the same evolutionary order as human beings. The argument from 
parsimony leads us to prefer interpreting the amoeba's behavior on 
analogy as well as disanalogy with human stimulus-response behavior. 
This means that we must be able to conceive mental states for the amoeba, 
but ones which are much simpler than in the human case. The amoeba 
lacks sense organs, and so its mentality lacks the different types of 
sensation corresponding to different human sense organs. It also lacks 
the specific types of organ pain peculiar to different sense organs, such as 
blinding visual pain or repugnant odor pain. Thus the amoeba contains no 
visual sensations, hearing sensations, or smell sensations at all. We must 
assert a generalized sensation of pain, tension or discomfort without the 
presence of structurally differentiated sense organs. We know from the 
human case that discomfort is common to some taste sensations, some 
visual sensations, and some audio sensations. In this sense it is a common 
sensible. We are contemplating the possibility of generalized discomfort 
that is neither that of light sensations, taste sensations, or audio sensations. 
But the supposed mentality of the amoeba or even of the reflected 
photon, though much simpler than human mentality, is not the simplest 
conceivable mentality. For it contains the complexity of reflectively 
contrasting discomfort and well-being to each other. A conceivable mind 
on the next simpler would experience well-being followed by discomfort, 
followed by decay and the cessation of sensation. Mind on this level 
includes discomfort reflecting on lost well-being, but no well-being 
reflecting on pain overcome. 
Since the argument from parsimony depends on the conceivability of 
the mind of a photon in a vacuum or of the mind of an amoeba, it itself 
requires us to go beyond the concept of mind in general and to distinguish 
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different types of possible mental happenings. The parsimony argument 
depends on the premise that anthropomorphism can be avoided, that the 
subhuman mind of an amoeba, or even of an unchanging and absolutely 
stable particle, is not excluded. The genetic argument, however, proceeds 
to conclude that the logically possible mind of an unreduced particle 
capable of adaptive stimulus-response behavior and of eventual decay is 
not merely logically possible but is actual. It is actual so long as we deny 
that a complex biological mind could have radically emerged all at once, 
without evolving from a conceivably simpler mind. Ultimately we have 
to weigh what is more likely: 1. the evolutionary emergence of a complex 
whole from some conceivably simpler mind or 2. the radical emergence of 
mental complexity out of no simpler mind. If the evolutionary emergence 
of atomic complexity from simpler particles is accepted in physics, what 
reason do we have to discount it in the theory of the mind in favor of a 
radical emergence of mental complexity out of no simpler mind (as in 
epiphenomenalism or in creationism)? 
We have pointed to a very general analogy between a primitive organism 
and the human mind, but there is a dissimilarity we have not mentioned. 
The connection between the human sensation of well-being and self-
maintenance of the human organism is less necessary than in the case of 
a one-celled organism. Much as a rat on a treadmill can be so addicted to 
pleasure that it eventually dies of exhaustion, a human being on drugs may 
experience a euphoria that is very dangerous to health. The reason is that 
a human mind, as the central control center of a hierarchically organized 
organism, can malfunction by losing active channels of communication 
with other organs. This is similar to the way in which Louis XVI might 
have felt quite happy at the palace in Versailles by not receiving messages 
regarding what was happening on the streets of Paris. But the amoeba and 
even the photon reflected off a non-transparent surface is in a different 
situation. It is not the central control center of a complex system. Thus 
the connection between well-being and self-maintenance in the case of the 
human being is far looser than in the case of the amoeba or photon. 
David Skrbina convincingly argues that an abstract panpsychism 
which argues merely that everything in nature inwardly has mind in 
general, totally abstracting from or negating any positive concept of mind, 
has no explanatory value. 
Panpsychism ... only claims that all things (however defined) 
possess some mind-like quality. It says nothing, per se, about 
the nature of mind, nor of the specific relationship of mind to 
matter .... The view that it "crumbles to nothing" (Humphrey) 
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when pressed to do explanatory work is the consequence of the 
lack of a corresponding concept of mind. To be fully intelligible 
the panpsychist outlook must be joined with a positive theory of 
mind. (Skrbina, 2005p. 249) 
I have argued for a theory of mind that is not merely general but that 
is specific and positive in identifying the type of mentality that has 
explanatory value at a given stage of evolution. Regarding "the specific 
relationship of mind to matter," our positive theory of mind assumes 
that we know minds under merely false, apparent, unreduced physical 
dispositional descriptions as well as under true non-physical occurrent 
mental descriptions. 
Although we have argued that physical properties are reducible, we 
continue to work with them in a penultimate stage of analysis. Our theory 
of mind thus asserts that events under a mental description can so-to-
speak have a "causal power" to alter events under a physical description, 
and vice versa. Damage to living tissue causes pain, and pain causes 
withdrawal from the physical causes of such damage. We refer to sub-
human mental states under the description of causing behavioral changes 
manifesting flight from a hostile environment. We are aware of well-
being by direct acquaintance, but we can also identify it under the very 
different description of tending to cause a continuation of established 
behavior. When human beings and even rats continue rewarding behavior, 
without hypothesizing sentience of positive tonality there is a gap in our 
explanation of the self-maintenance of behavior. Th~ pleasure makes the 
behavior pattern understandable by virtue of its causal tendency. And this 
may be accepted even though, at more ultimate level of analysis, causal 
tendencies disappear in favor of the emergent present event's act of self-
conformation to the past. 
Conclusion. Materialists like Paul Churchland need to consider 
the explanatory power of different panpsychist hypotheses for a fuller 
explanation of the behavior of different bodies. They also need to look 
more carefully at the analysis of physical properties before they conclude 
that panpsychism has no explanatory of predictive power. 
Works Cited 
Anscombe, Elizabeth. (1964) Before and After. The Philosophical Review 
73(1): 3-24. 
Aristotle. (1941) Physics. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye (trans.). In Richard 
McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (pp. 213-394). New York: 
Random House. 
107 
Clark Butler 
Basile, Pierfrancesco. (2008) Mind-Body Problem and Panpsychism. In Michel 
Weber and Will Desmond ( eds. ), Handbook ofWhiteheadian Process Thought 
(vol. 1, pp. 383-394). Heusenstamm, Germany: Ontos Verlag. 
Butler, Clark. (1972) The Mind-Body Problem: A Non-Materialistic Identity 
Thesis. Idealistic Studies 2(3): 230-248. 
__ . ( 1978) Panpsychism: A Restatement of the Genetic Argument. Idealistic 
Studies 8(1): 33-39. 
__ . (1981) Motion and Objective Contradictions. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 18(2): 131-139. 
Chalmers, David. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Churchland, Paul. ( 1996) A Brief Critique ofPanpsychism. In Clark Butler ( ed. ), 
History as the Story of Freedom (pp. 211-215). Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Donnellan, Keith. (1966) Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical 
Review 75(3): 281-304. 
Edwards, Paul. (1976) Panpsychism. In Paul Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (volume 5, pp. 22-31 ). New York: MacMillan. 
Gao, Chang. (2006) How Do Objects Move? [http://www.quantummotion.org/ 
hom.html]. Accessed 9/22/08. 
Griffin, David Ray. (1998) Unsnarling the World Knot. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Hartshorne, Charles. (1972) Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-
1970. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
__ . (1984) Creativity in American Philosophy. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
Hegel, G. W.F. (2008) Lectures on Logic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Neville, Robert. (1974) The Cosmology of Freedom. New Haven, CN: Yale 
University Press. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1967) The Will to Power. New York: Random House. 
Robinson, Abraham. (1996) Non-Standard Analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Skrbina, David. (2005) Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Spinoza, Baruch. (2000) Ethics. London: Oxford University Press. 
Strawson, Galen. (2006) Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails 
Panpsychism. In Anthony Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in 
Nature (pp.33-65). Exeter, UK: Imprint-Academic. 
Whitehead, Alfred North. (1979) Process and Reality. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. Abbreviation: PR. 
108 
